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THE NEW YORK HOME RULE AMENDMENT
IN THE COURTS
It is doubtful whether the tenets of any of the great schools
of jurisprudence find material support in those recent decisions of
the New York courts wherein was concerned the division of governmental functions between the State and the municipality.
Strangely enough, before the adoption of the so-called Home Rule
Amendment to the Constitution, there could be found in the
reports a judicial tendency toward a fuller recognition of municipal
power.' With the relaxation of the organic law, 2 we find strong
evidence of a contrary tendency.' Nor is more consideration
shown for the theories of the sociological jurists than for those of
their historical confreres. With the constant and pronounced
trend of population toward the cities and the resultant increase
not only of the complexities of local problems but of the need
for adequate and efficient municipal government, we find the
'See e.g., People v. Raymond, 37 N. Y. 428, 431 (1868); People,
ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50, 56 (1873); Rathbone v.
'Wirth, 150 N. Y. 459, 468, 45 N. E. 15 (1896), where Judge Gray, considering the import of Article X, Sec. 2 of the State Constitution, at the
time the only provision relating to the selection of local officers, said,
"It ought not to require much of argument to show the importance of
this clause in our Constitution or what its presence means for our political
institutions. * * * It means the right to choose their local officers,
in all its reality; or it means nothing." And Judge O'Brien, in his
opinion in the same case, 487, "The true interpretation, scope and meaning
of this section of the Constitution has been frequently passed upon by
this court, and it has been uniformly held that its obvious purpose was
to secure to the people of the cities, towns and villages of the state the.
right to have the local offices administered by officers selected by themselves. It was designed to protect and give force and effect to the
principle of local self-government which has always been regarded as
fundamental in our political institutions."
In the leading case of People, ex rel. Met. St. Ry. Co. v. Tax
Comrs., 174 N. Y. 417, 67 N. E. 69, ff'd. 199 U. S. 1, the Court devoted
four pages of its opinion to an illuminating discussion of the history
of the principle of local governmenf in matters of local concern, of the
extensive application of this principle in the American colonies, of the
resultant necessity of interpreting the Constitution in this light, and of
the inviolability of the principle generally. See also Peo., ex rel. Town of
Pelham v. Village of Pelham, 215 N. Y. 374, 109 N. E. 513 (1915).
2N. Y. Const. Art. XII, §§ 2-7, -as amended.
' See cases discussed infra.
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courts jealously resisting any assumption of power by local bodies.
As the social considerations become more compelling, as the pressure of public -opinion increases, there is encountered an apparent
reversal of the judicial attitude. Government, one might deduce,
should be territorial rather than representative, and no longer can
be accepted at face value the definition of a municipal corporation as "a political or governmental agency of the State, which
has been constituted for the local government of the territorial
division described and which exercises by delegation, a portion
.of the sovereign power for the public good." I In seeking explanation of these enigmatical decisions, one cannot well overlook the
potency of what may be termed personal factors, of the private
view-points of individual judges, of their innate distrust of the
wholesomeness of municipal administration. It is of course, not
suggested that these factors have been permitted to counterbalance the courts' concept of those weightier considerations of
social need and public good.
In the State of New York, with a large metropolis overshadowing in importance, the remainder of the State, it was
inevitable that "home rule" legislation should appear on the statute
books. Until late in 1923, determined and persistent opposition
successfully forestalled this result. Even after the people, both
through the legislature and at the polls, had stated their purpose
to permit local legislation in respect of the property, affairs and
government of cities, we find eminent counsel strenuously urging
the invalidity of the Constitutional Amendment. 5 One argument
much insisted upon, was that, since, between the original passage
by the legislature of the amending resolution and its repassage
by the succeeding legislature, two words had been changed by a
prior proposed amendment, the repassed resolution was amendatory
of a different constitution from that sought to be affected by the
resolution as originally adopted. The two words, inserted solely
in the interests of clarity, were correctly found by the Court to
be not of the substance of the provision. The other, and more
serious contention, was that since the amendatory resolutions had
been entered in the legislative journals not in full, but by title
and reference only, the attempted amendment was abortive. The
MacMullen v. City of Middletown, 187 N. Y. 37, 41, 79 N. E. 863,

(1907).
'Browne v. City of New York, 241 N. Y. 96, 149 N. E. 21 (1925).
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Appellate Division valiantly supported this contention," despite the
facts that practically every amendment to the Constitution and
some two hundred local laws would thereby be invalidated. 7 The
Court of Appeals, more salutary than valiant, was of opinion that
the word "enter" did not require entry in extenso, but entry by
sufficient reference merely.
Though the Amendment successfully survived the attack upon
its validity, the local laws passed by virtue of it and its statutory
concomitant, the City Home Rule Law, s have not fared so well
in the courts. The same Browne decision is the leading case upon
the construction of the legislation. In that case, the City of New
York adopted local laws authorizing it to acquire, and operate,
buses upon the city streets. Taxpayers' actions were brought to
enjoin the city and its officers from disbursing public funds in the
administration of these local laws. The Court of Appeals held
the local legislation invalid. From an examination of its prior
decisions, it readily found that the City of New York had been
consistently denied permission to engage in the business of a
common carrier,9 both by the courts and the legislature. Starting
with the premise that there had previously been no such power
in the City, the Court examined the Home Rule Amendment and
Act and failed to find such power there conferred. The Court,
in passing, said (and this is indicative of its attitude), "The title
of the act must be classed as a misnomer if it has given currency to the belief that cities have been emancipated from the
power of the Legislature in respect of every legitimate subject
of local interest or concern. Nothing of the kind has been accomplished or attempted." 10 Continuing, the Court proceeded to
enumerate five classifications within which local legislation, to be
valid, must necessarily fall. Though the wording of the statute
is closely followed, it might not be amiss to here repeat those
'Browne v. City of New York, 213 App. Div. 206, 211 N. Y. Supp.
306 (1st Dept., 1925).
'See brief of Home Rule Commission, amicus curiae.
'Laws of New York, 1924, Chap. 363, as amended, constituting
Chap. 76, Consolidated Laws.
'Brooklyn City R. R. Co. v. Whalen, 191 App. Div. 737, 182 N. Y.
Supp. 283, aff'd. 229 N. Y. 570 (2nd Dept., 1920), and Schafer v. City
of New York, 206 App. Div. 747, (leave to appeal denied by Court of
Appeals, July 15, 1923), were among the cases cited for this proposition.
"' Supra, note 5, 241 N. Y. 96 at 119.
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classifications, if for no other reason than that they have been
quite uniformly adhered to in subsequent decisions.
"They (the local laws) must touch a city in its property, affairs or government in one or more of certain enumerated ways, i.e., by 'relating' (1) 'to the powers, duties,
qualifications, number, mode of selection and removal, terms
of office' or 'compensation' of 'officers and employees of the
city,' or (2) 'the transaction of its business, the incurring
of its obligations,' or 'the presentation, ascertainment and
discharge of claims against it' or (3) 'the acquisition, care,
management and use of its streets and property,' or (4)
'the wages, salaries, hours of labor, etc., of employees of
its contractors and subcontractors,' or (5) 'the government
and regulation of the conduct of its inhabitants and the
protection of their property, safety and health.'""1:
In the Brozwne case it was said that the power there claimed
by the city had to find justification in subdivisions (1), (3) or
(5). None of these was considered sufficiently broad to authorize
a departure from what the Court considered a well-defined legislative policy in denial of the City's contention.
It is quite unfortunate that in the first case to reach the
Court of Appeals there was inseparably involved with the question
of the validity of local legislation, the further and oft-mooted
question of the wisdom of municipal operation of transit facilities.
Many of the statements by the Court were, no doubt, made with
the two-fold question in mind. From an examination of the
case, it would seem that the decision could have been reached
upon technical grounds (for the municipal legislature proved inexperienced) and the indication of the Court's attitude toward
the whole subject of home rule in the light of the recent legislation could well have been deferred to a more opportune occasion.
In fact, the Court, in the closing words of its opinion plainly
stated that no attempt was being made to mark with precision the
limits of valid local legislation. 12 This statement, however, came
too late-the Court had spoken-and future citations refer not
to the closing reservations but to the classifications before mentioned and to remarks properly applicable only to the peculiar
circumstances of the case.
Ibid.
Ibid. 125.
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But, aside from these considerations, what may be said of the
general attitude of the Court? The State Constitution had been
recently amended to allow of greater independence in municipal
affairs; the City Home Rule Law, declaratory of the Amendment
and of its purpose had recently been enacted. Accordingly, a
relaxation by the courts might well be expected. Nevertheless it
was found that the legislative intent that the City of New York
should not become a common carrier still persisted. This intent
is said to have been often reiterated; still, it is common knowledge
that for many years it had been the legislative intent that the
governmental powers of cities, especially New York City, should
not be extended. The newer legislative intent was professedly
"to enable cities to adopt and amend local laws for the purpose
of fully and completely exercising the powers granted to cities
by the terms and spirit of such article (i.e., the Home Rule
Amendment to the Constitution.)" 13 Then too, it is worthy of
note that the legislature, evidently to guard against a flood of
clearly invalid legislation, specifically excepted nine instances from
the scope of its action, but made no reference to the matters
here considered.' 4
The Browne case, itself of prime importance, acts also as an
introduction to an interesting line of cases, few in number because of the limited period covered, but supplementing by variety
their lack in that respect. One of the two other cases bearing
upon the subject in which the Court of Appeals has written an
opinion, is Matter of McCabe v. Voorhis, 5 in which a voter
applied for a peremptory order of mandamus to compel the New
York City board of elections to omit from the ballot for the next
general election a local law having as its titular object the prevention of an increased fare on rapid transit lines without the consent
of the electorate. The proposition was regularly adopted by the
municipal assembly and transmitted to the board of elections, a
board charged, says the Court, with the "ministerial duty of submitting local laws to the vote of the people."Ic, Continuing, in
the course of a discussion of the rights and duties of this ministerial board, we find the Court saying, "the question next arises
"' City Home Rule Law, supra, note 8, Sec. 30.

"Ibid. Sec. 21.
"243 N. Y. 401, 153 N. E. 849 (1926).
"Ibid. 410.
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as to the public duty of the board of elections. Unquestionably
it must determine for itself whether the law is in form a local
law and in fact properly transmitted to the board."17 This board,
we are told, may refuse to submit to the people a proposition
'not on its face such a local law as should be submitted for the
approval of the electors" 3 -8a truly anomalous situation, a body
charged with a "ministerial duty" determining the limits of legislation. As has been well stated in a recent Appellate Division decision,' 9
and as was recognized in the iMicCabe case,2 0 the determination by
the courts of questions of this character in the necessary haste
of disposing of pre-election contests is, to say the least, hazardous.
If this be true of judicial action, how much more so is it true
of the action of a body ill-equipped to exercise judicial functions?
Passing now to the consideration of the validity of the local
law involved, we find two grounds of objection. The purpose
of the law as summarized in the title was to prevent an increased
fare upon rapid transit lines without the approval of the electorate.
In terms, however, the law forbade the adoption by the board of
estimate of any resolution permitting changes in franchises or
operating contracts that would result in an increased fare, that
would grant to any company a preferential, bonus or subsidy or
that would release a company from any of the public service
obligations of a franchise or contract, without the consent of the
people of the city. Once again the local legislators had been
imprudent and the Court could have contented itself with
restraining the submission of the proposition in the form proposed.
But the Court went further, and though at the time declining to
decide whether the local legislation was invalid in that it related
to matters other than the property, affairs or government of cities,
it did hold the law invalid as an unauthorized attempt to supersede state legislation. Contracts for the effectuation of Transit
Commission plans were required by State law to be approved by
the board of estimate or other local authority.21 The electorate
"Ibid. 411.
"Ibid.
"Bareham v. City of Rochester, 221 App. D . 36, 222 N. Y. Supp.
141 (4th Dept., 1927).
'°Supra, note 15, 4.
"Public Service Commissions Law, § 12, as amended by Laws, 1925.
Chap. 641.
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was not, said the Court, a local authority. Therefore, legislation
which would divest the board of estimate of plenary power must
fall. But the entire argument of the Court was based upon the
assumption that the law providing for a transit commission in
cities of a million or more inhabitants 22 was a general, and not
a special, city law. Support for this construction was found in
the leading McAneny 23 case, decided, however, before the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment and in reliance upon an illconsidered line of cases holding generality in the terms of a
statute to be the test of generality in effect. The Amendment,
as has been well brought out in a lower court decision, 24 prohibits
State legislation "special or local either in its terms or in its
effect." 23 When the State legislation was adopted, the City of
New York was, and still is, the only city of the State with a
population of more than a million. The prospects of additions
to the class were, and still are largely visionary. It is submitted
that the adoption of the legislation in this form was but an
attempt to take advantage of the New York rule of construction
and to accomplish by indirection what the Constitution, even
prior to amendment, might have been found to prohibit. Once
again, as in the Browne case, the quarrel is not with the result
as such, but with the unneeded arguments of the Court, so indicative of its attitude and so avidly seized upon by other and
equally unsympathetic courts.
The Browne and McCabe cases have thus been dealt with at
some length because subsequent decisions upon the subject, no
matter what their holding, are professed to be based upon the
"principles" of either or both of these cases.
An interesting case is Schieffelin v. Berry,2 r which involved
Pub. Serv. Com. L. § 4a; L. 1921, Chap. 134.
"' Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N. Y. 377, 134
N. E. 187 (1922).
See discussion of this matter in Schieffelin v. McLaughlin, 127
Misc. (N. Y.) 56 (1926) where it was held that a State statute, applying
in terms to police commissioners of all cities of the State, but which in
effect could reach but one, was "local, special and unconstitutional" under
N. Y. Const. Art. XII, § 2, as amended. The Court reviews and
criticizes, in the course of its opinion, the leading decisions upon the
matter of interpretation.
' N. Y. Const. Art. XII, § 2, as amended.
2'217 App. Div. 451, 216 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1st Dept., 1926), aff'd
without opinion by the Court of Appeals, Pound and Crane, J. J., dis.
senting, 243 N. Y. 603, 154 N. E. 623 (1926).
--
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the validity of amendments to the New York City Charter provisions for an employees' retirement system. These provisions
fixed retirement ages dependent upon the character of the work
performed and directed the payment of compensation approximating one-half of the employee's average annual salary for the ten
years preceding his retirement.17 Half the compensation was paid
by the city; the other was provided by the employee's contributions
during his working years. The State legislature, in 1921, included
within the City retirement system, the recording officers and clerks
of the five counties within Greater New York. 2

In

1925, by

local law, the City reduced the retirement age of all classes five
years and fixed as the measure of the pension, the employee's
average earnings for his last five working years. A taxpayer
sued to restrain payment out of the retirement fund to an exMayor of the City. The injunction was granted. Though the
Court admitted that payments made under the system would be
for a city purpose, still no proper occasion for local legislation had
been presented, it said, because the legislation attempted affected
the "property, affairs or government of a county." Though the
Legislature had expressly included county employees, relatively
few in number, within the City retirement system, the local action
must be frustrated and the legislation fall in toto, because in the
Home Rule Act, the Court could find a legislative intent to con2
tinue county government9.
This intent, we must assume, was
sufficiently strong to effect a recapture, as it were, of a matter
already delegated to the city.
A case somewhat related is Schieffelin v. Leary, 30 a taxpayer's
suit protesting against an increase in annual salary, granted to the
President Justice of the Municipal Court of the City of New
York. There is a salary prescribed for justices in the New York
City Municipal Court Code."' This salary is paid by the City of
New York from moneys raised by local taxation. Two local
laws were adopted permitting the municipal authorities to fix with
'§§ 1700-1725, Laws 1901, Chap. 446, as amended.
'Laws 1921, Chap. 271.
'City Home Rule Law, supra, note 8, § 21 (9), which prohibits
local legislation superseding State statutes if the local law "Applies to or
affects any provision of law relating to the property, affairs or government of a county or counties."
"219 App. Div. 660, 220 N. Y. Supp. 587 (1st Dept., 1927).
" Laws 1915, Chap. 279, as amended by Laws 1920, Chap. 829, § 3.

NEW YORK HOME RULE AMENDMENT

certain exceptions, salaries of those paid out of the City Treasury.
Pursuant to those laws, defendant was regularly voted an increase.
The Court set aside the City's action on the ground that a
municipal court justice was a State officer. This proposition was
predicated upon a decision of the Court of Appeals in 1876,
holding that the City was without power to reduce the salary of
a clerk of the old District Court of the City of New York. 12 It
is strange that this case should be considered a binding authority
after the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment, and despite
the fact that in the much respected Browne case, the Court of
Appeals had included within its classifications local legislation
relating to "the incurring of its (the municipality's) obligations." "
It is difficult also to follow the Court's contention that a State
function was here being usurped, for in the Constitution, as
amended, we find that "all elections of city officers, including
supervisors and judicial officers of inferior local courts" shall be
held in odd-numbered years when State offices are not to be
filled. 34 While speaking of elections, it might be interesting to
advert for a moment to the opinion in People e.r rel. Casler v.
Eysaman, 3 where the Court after finding that a proposition presented to the voters had not been adopted the prescribed number
of' days prior to the election and was therefore irregular, proceeded to say that even had the proposition been timely, it could
not have been voted upon at the 1924 election because at that
time State officials were to be elected. Aside from the fact that
no such restriction appears in the Constitution or Home Rule
Act, one might ask, if the Leary case be correct, when, if ever,
local laws could be submitted to the electorate. Local judicial
officers are elected in odd-numbered years; they are "State
officers;" the gubernatorial election occurs in the even numbered
years; all the general elections seem closed to local propositions.
It is indeed questionable that it was the legislative intent that
local propositions be not voted upon at the next succeeding
election. From the very nature of local legislation, one, it seems,
could logically infer that delay, in many cases, would successfully
thwart the purpose of the entire scheme. And again, when we
2

" Whitmore v. Mayor, 67 N. Y. 21 (1876).
' Supra, note 5 at 119.
" N. Y. Const. Art. XII, § 6, as amended.
126 Misc. 853, 214 N. Y. Supp. 416 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer Cty., 1926).
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find that special elections, always expensive matters, may be called
for action upon such propositions, the position of the Court seems
hardly tenable.6
Further reference to decisions invalidating local legislation
would serve no useful purpose. Of the cases construing the
Amendment and Act, but two have fully upheld the local laws
attacked.3 7 In these cases, as was stated during the course of
the opinions, no extension of municipal power had been attempted.
The Commissioner of Accounts of New York City had long
had the power to subpoena witnesses and records for examination,
nor could it be properly urged that his power was unconstitutional in that he was authorized to subpoena officials of the
counties within the City.38 In the other case, the authority of the
Commissioner of Parks to collect rentals for the temporary use
of public lands was declared to have been long recognized. 39
There is one decision in New York, however, which is believed to have given expression to the true legislative intent.4"
For the first time, we find a court citing and applying those
provisions of the Home Rule Act in which the Legislature concisely stated its intent and directed that a liberal construction be
accorded the provisions of the Act.4 The Court not only cited
these sections, but applied them, holding valid the scheme for the
readjustment of the municipal government of Rochester. The
opinion here referred to, that of the Appellate Division, appeared
in May of this year. The case was shortly heard in the Court
of Appeals, and in mid-summer appeared its decision, 42 written
by a man previously a member of the law department of the City
of New York and who had, as such, appeared for the City in
See City Home Rule Law, supra, note 8, §§ 15-20 with regard to
popular action upon local propositions.
" Matter of McLaughlin, 124 Misc. 766, 210 N. Y. Supp. 68 (Sup.
Ct. N. Y. Cty., 1926), and Tobin v. Hennessey, 130 Misc. 226, 223 N. Y.
Supp. 676 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty., 1927).
'Matter of McLaughlin, supra, note 37.
'Tobin v. Hennessey, supra, note 37 at 227.
'*Bareham v. Rochester, supra, note 19.
" City Home Rule Law, § 30, supra, note 13; also § 31, which
directs, "This chapter shall be construed liberally. The powers herein
granted shall be in addition to all other powers granted to cities by other

provisions of law."
'Bareham

O'Brien, J.

v. Rochester, 246 N. Y. 141

(July, 1927),

opinion per
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prior similar proceedings. The opinion begins, liberally enough,
with a review of the legislative purpose. The sections of the
Home Rule Act above referred to, 43 for the first time were mentioned by the Court of Appeals, but, unfortunately, not applied.
That part of the local legislation which was believed to supersede
sections of the Election Law was held invalid because the section
numbers, etc., of the supposedly general provisions had not been
specifically mentioned for repeal in the local enactments. The
section of the Act upon which the Court relies, from its terms.
appears to be directory merely and inserted solely for the sake of
clarity.44 Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the legislation and
once more a decision reveals what may be termed the prevailing
judicial attitude.
VINCENT

J.

KEANE.

Brooklyn, N. Y.
"Supra, note 41.
" City Home Rule Act, supra, note 8, § 12 (1). "Any local law
adopted pursuant to this chapter may specify any provision of an act
of the legislature by reference to chapter number (etc.), which provision

relates to the subject matter of such local law and does not in terms
and in effect apply alike to all cities
*
and upon the taking effect
of such local law, such provision * *
shall cease to have any force
or effect in such city * * *"

